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Pratt: Second Circuit and § 1983

SECTION 1983 IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Hon. Leon D. Lazer:
We have a little bonus in this program today. We are going to
review the significant holdings of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. Judge Pratt, Professor of Law at
Touro Law Center, will discuss the Second Circuit holdings.
Judge Pratt, as you know, served as a member of the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit following his distinguished career
as a Federal District Judge for the City of New York. He came to
that bench with a great background, particularly in municipal
law. He has served as a law clerk to Judge Froessel of the New
York Court of Appeals. He has served as Special Counsel to the
Board of Supervisors of Nassau County and to many of the
municipalities in Nassau County. He is a graduate of Yale Law
School and he is a professor of this law school, of whom we are
extremely proud. So, Judge Pratt and Professor Pratt, we would
love to hear about the Second Circuit.
Hon. George C. Pratt:
Thank you, Leon. Professor Schwartz, you upset me. For many
years, I have been training myself in everything that I had written
to get rid of the Latinisms. I had always been under the
impression that when a lawyer or a judge uses a Latinism. it is
because things have gone out of focus. They do not really know
what they are talking about, and if they cover it up with a
Latinism, then nobody else will really understand it either
because they do not understand the Latinism. Now, you say the
Supreme Court uses a Latinism to say we really mean it. And
you have told me now that by eliminating all the Latinisms from
my opinions you say I never really meant anything. I have been
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teaching students in appellate advocacy not to use Latinisms. My
whole writing style has to change.
You may wonder why, in a Supreme Court conference, I am
here talking about the Second Circuit. Well, I am here and that is
what I am going to talk about. From the point of view of this exSecond Circuit Judge, even while I was on the Circuit, you look
at the Supreme Court and you cannot help but get the impression
that with their legal and philosophical abilities, playing around
with a lot of the theory and doctrine, they are trying to keep the
conceptual process together. But in the Circuit Court, where
appeals are taken as a matter of right and there is no choice, you
deal with everything. And you are much closer to being down
there in the mud, rubbing around resolving everyday, real
problems. Of course, the Supreme Court stands there, ready to
review whatever the Second Circuit may have done wrong.
It is of some amusement to me to take a look at what the
Second Circuit does in the area of municipal litigation, which is
basically Section 1983.1 I look at it year by year, June to June.
This past year, ending this past June, is the first year that the
Second Circuit has been operating for a full year without my
presence. How did they do? Well, to begin with, I was told last
week by Judge Altimari 2 - I do not know if he is accurate on his
numbers, but I have no reason to doubt them - there were twelve
appeals from the Second Circuit to the Supreme Court that the
Supreme Court took 3 Significantly, the one case which they
4
affirmed is an opinion by Judge Altimari.
Anyway, what has the Second Circuit done over this past year?
One of the basic overall patterns in this area of Section 1983
I. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
2. Judge Frank X. Altimari is a Senior Judge for the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
3. See Performance in the U.S. Supreme Court, N.Y. L.J., September
27, 1996, at 3.
4. See Lewis v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2163, 2168 (1996) (affirming
the Second Circuit's holding that the offense of obstructing the mail, which
carries a 6 month maximum prison sentence, should be treated as a petty
offense, thus not entitling the defendant to a jury trial even when several
counts are tried together).
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concerned the municipalities and municipal officials. 5 The pattern
is very similar to what it was the previous year. They wrote
opinions in 55 cases. The previous year they wrote 50. Of
course, that is not the full extent of the Section 1983 litigation.
The Second Circuit uses a summary order procedure, and you
can generally figure that it is roughly two summary orders for
every opinion. There is no way to know precisely how many of
the summary orders relate to Section 1983 issues because the
orders simply resolve the issues in the case. Without full
discussion, the judgment decrees that the district judge is
affirmed, maybe for the reasons set by the district court, or
maybe just affirmed, period. They use that type of order, of
course, when they find there is no jurisprudential purpose in
writing an opinion.
At least in 55 cases they found there was a jurisprudential
purpose in writing an opinion. Overall, this represents the work
of roughly 10 percent of the Court. In handling them, there were
32 reversals and 23 affirmances. Adding summary orders, all of
which are affirmances, you get a reversal rate of somewhere
around 24 percent, which is not far off, and is normally what is
expected in the Circuit Court.
In terms of the opinion cases, who is winning? In 42 percent of
the cases, the plaintiff won in the Circuit Court and in 58
percent, the defendants won. In short, there is nothing really
startling about this overall picture and the flow of litigation
during the past year.
In terms of who is bringing these cases up to the Circuit Court,
the cases that get the attention in terms of opinions, not
surprisingly, come from people most familiar with the work of
the courts. The greatest number, 36 percent, which consists of a
5. See, e.g., Kaplan v. County of Sullivan. 74 F.3d 398 (2d Cir. 1996)
(concerning a county resident's action to set aside a county redistricting plan
alleging that the plan diluted his vote for county legislator by excluding
prisoners from the population base for redistricting purposes); Greenwich
Citizens Committee, Inc. v. Counties of Warren and Washington Industrial
Development Agency, 77 F.3d 26, 31 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that retaliatory

intent is required for governmental liability in retaliatory First Amendment
claims).
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third of the cases in which they wrote opinions, involve
prisoners. 6 It is not surprising that the number of cases brought
by prisoners has increased because we have doubled the number
of prisoners. We keep throwing people in jail and give them
nothing to do. Why should not they be generating litigation? It is
a national pastime for them. Many of the cases they bring
complain about the disciplinary proceedings within the prison.
They are not noted for careful observance of due process rights, 8
but they are getting a little better in New York. Others cases
complain about the various types of prison conditions, whether
they are getting kosher meals, or color television, or whatever.
They have all kinds of grievances. But the prisoners are
becoming better and better in framing those grievances under
Section 1983. 9 Some of them get more and more attention of the
Courts and even more and more attention of the Second Circuit.
6. See, e.g., Champion v. Artuz, 76 F.3d 483 (2d Cir. 1996) (rejecting a
prisoner's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against prison officials for
revocation of his conjugal rights and a search of his prison cell in retaliation
for his complaints about denial of conjugal visits); Hayes v. New York City
Dep't of Corrections, 84 F.3d 614 (1996) (dismissing a prisoner's appeal from
a decision granting summary judgment against his Eighth Amendment claim);
Koehl v. Dalsheim, 85 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 1996) (remanding a prisoner's appeal
claiming an unconstitutional deprivation of medical attention for his eye
condition): Laza v. Reish. 84 F.3d 578 (2d Cir. 1996) (raising a 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 action claiming punitive detention and deprivation of prisoner's liberty
interest by segregating him from the general population without a hearing).
7. See, e.g., Black v. Coughlin III, 76 F.3d 72 (1996) (regarding a
prisoner's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action to recover damages as a result of an
improperly conducted disciplinary hearing).
8. See, e.g., Branhan v. Meachum, 77 F.3d 626 (2d Cir. 1996) (claiming
Eighth Amendment and Due Process violations); Laza v. Reish, 84 F.3d 578
(2d Cir. 1996) (claiming Due Process and Fifth Amendment violations);
Champion v. Artuz, 76 F.3d 483 (2d Cir. 1996) (claiming Due Process and
Equal Protection violations).
9. See, e.g., Laza v. Reish, 84 F.3d 578 (2d Cir. 1996) (addressing a
prisoner's claim that he was subjected to unlawful punishment upon his
transfer from state to federal prison brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Johnson
v. Bax, 63 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 1996) (instituting a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action
against the police department and the City of New York for First Amendment
deprivation when demonstrator was arrested for displaying an anti-Clinton
sign); Allen v. Coughlin III, 64 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1996) (bringing an action
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About 16 percent of the cases that the Court wrote on involved
what many people think of as a typical Section 1983 case:
confrontations between citizens and police,' 0 false arrest,"
malicious

involved
Business
account
students

prosecution, 12

and

brutality

cases.' 3

Employees

4
about 15 percent of the claims that were addressed. '
owners complaining about excess municipal regulation
for about 9 percent.' 5 About 7 percent concerned6
complaining about what is going on in the schools.'

And then there is a whole bunch of other cases.' 7 Not an atypical
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 alleging authorities violated the inmate's
rights to due process and equal protection by seizing his newspaper clippings).
10. See, e.g., Lennon v. Miller, 66 F.3d 416 (2d Cir. 1996) (instituting an
action against police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for forcibly removing
woman from an automobile after she refused to do so voluntarily).
11. Id.

12. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bax, 63 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 1996).
13. See, e.g., Blisset v. Coughlin III, 66 F.3d 531 (2d Cir. 1995)
(affirming a judgment in favor of an inmate for claims of unnecessary force
and his condition of confinement by correctional officers): Allen v. Coughlin
111, 64 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding prison officials were entitled to
qualified immunity when guards seized newspaper clippings twice from
prisoner).
14. See, e.g., Jayaraj v. Scappini, 66 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 1996) (challenging
the City's failure to renew the municipal employee's employment contract
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Jemmott v. Coughlin. 85 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1996)
(claiming racial discrimination against an employee by co-employees in
violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l), and in violation of U.S.C.
§§ 1981 and 1983).
15. See, e.g., Blue v. Koren, 72 F.3d 1075 (2d Cir. 1995) (alleging that
Medicare participants in nursing home were subject to over-rigorous
governmental regulations and inspections).
16. See, e.g., Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free School District No. 3, 85 F.3d
839 (2d Cir. 1996) (addressing a claim by students against their school district
under the Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074, for denial of a
provision in their Bible study club charter restricting officers of the club to the
Christian faith); Gant v. Wallingsord Board of Education, 69 F.3d 669 (2d
Cir. 1995) (asserting racial discrimination as the basis of the school board's
decision of a first grade kindergarten student being left back one grade).
17. See, e.g., Kolonsi v. New York State Office of Mental Retardation
and Developmental Disabilities, 64 F.3d 810 (2d Cir. 1996) (discussing a 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claim brought by a former psychologist alleging the state
violated his Fourteenth Amendment substantive and procedural due process
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array of types of people who are complaining. It is kind of
staggering, the problems that governments can get into. Of
course, the prison conditions are always there as are the problems
with the police, false arrest and brutality. 18
One of the cases that the Court dealt with was a SLAPP suit,
which stands for Strategic Litigation Against Public
Participation.1 9 It typically comes up in the zoning context. For
example, somebody applies for a permit, and the civic association
or neighborhood association takes concerted action before the
boards, and sometimes in Court, to prevent the project from
going ahead. Whenever you delay a construction project, you
cause extra costs to the developer, and those costs sometimes can
be recovered in a SLAPP suit. The Greenwich case, however,
was different: it was a claim against a municipality for bringing a
SLAPP suit.20t Because it falls within the classic cases that
Professor Schwartz mentioned, retaliation cases, the Supreme
2
Court had already dealt with what the standards should be. '
There were many other types of issues that were involved in
these Section 1983 actions. One challenged a state requirement
for bumper tests on cars. Another was whether the rule that
rights when it suspended him without pay even though he was found falsely
accused of sexual misconduct); Kaluczky v. City of White Plains, 57 F.3d 202
(2d Cir. 1995) (alleging the mayor and his administration violated a city
personnel officer's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights).
18. See supra notes 6 and 9.
19. See Greenwich Citizens Committee, Inc. v. Counties of Warren and
Washington Industrial Development Agency, 77 F.3d 26 (2d Cir. 1996). The
issue in Greenwich was "whether a governmental defendant in an underlying
state court lawsuit must be shown to have acted with retaliatory intent in filing
counterclaims before it may be held liable for chilling the First Amendment
rights of the plaintiffs who brought the lawsuit." Id. at 27-28.
20. See generally' William B. Chapman, LaPointe v. West Contra Costa
Sanitary District. C935 ALI-ABA 155 (1994) (describing the first successful
SLAPP suit initiated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
21. In Greenwich, the Second Circuit explains that "[tlhe question in each
case . . . [is] whether the underlying constitutional right contains any state-ofmind requirement." Greenivich, 77 F.3d at 30.
22. See Ass'n of Int'l Auto. Mfrs. v. Abrams, 84 F.3d 602 (2d Cir. 1996)
(concerning whether a statute relating to car bumpers violates the Commerce
and Due Process Clauses).
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denies prisoners the right to vote- 3 is unconstitutional because it
discriminates against blacks and Hispanics, based upon
disproportionate numbers of prisoners in those racial categories. 4
The Town of Smithtown had problems in the Second Circuit with
a garbage flow control ordinance. 25 It required that all the6
garbage in Smithtown be processed in the way Smithtown said.
But they cannot do it, according to the Second Circuit, since it
violates the commerce clause. 27 A claim under Section 1983
regarding retaliatory inspections of nursing homes also came
under the Second Circuit's scrutiny, as did questions of the
conditions under which a religious club can operate in a public
school.2 9 There was still another school case, whether or not a
school could require a student's public service as a condition of
graduation. 30 There were also
a couple of reapportionment cases
31
Circuit.
Second
the
before
All of these cases come under Section 1983. They present the
kinds of problems that municipal lawyers may have to face. You
can directly challenge the ordinance, or assert that the municipal
policy or custom violates some constitutional provision.3 " In none
of the cases where opinions were written was there any
discussion about the issue of whether or not there was a
municipal policy or custom. This used to be one of the issues that
kept coming up time and time again, but it seems to have
disappeared, at least temporarily, from the radar screen.
23. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 5-106(2)-(5) (McKinney 1978).

24. See Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 919 (2d Cir. 1996).
25. See SSC Corp. v. Town of Smithtown. 66 F.3d 502 (2d Cir. 1995).
26. Id. at 507.

27. Id.at 518.
28. See Blue v. Koren, 72 F.3d 1075 (2d Cir. 1995).
29. See Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free School District No. 3. 85 F.3d 839 (2d
Cir. 1996); supra note 16.
30. See Immediato v. Rye Neck School District, 73 F.3d 454 (2d Cir.
1996).
31. See, e.g., Roxbury v. Delaware Co. Bd. of Supervisors, 80 F.3d 42
(2d Cir. 1996) (finding no equal protection violation on claim brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 challenging the weighted voting system).
32. Id.at 44 (alleging that the method of electing members of the Board
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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Now, not surprisingly, the big issues in the Second Circuit are
similar to the big issues in the Supreme Court. Litigation runs in
phases, fads. Courts seem to focus on similar types of issues
around the country at given times. I guess this is because lawyers
come to seminars and do things to get ideas. And the two big
Section 1983 issues before the Circuit Court are the same as the
two big issues before the Supreme Court this past year, qualified
immunity 33 and retaliation claims. 34 The goal of the Supreme
Court in adopting their qualified immunity standard in Harlowe
v. Fitzgerald35was to get rid of more of these Section 1983 cases
than had been disposed of by means of summary judgment. Cut
them off at the pass, in effect. When you take Harlow and
combine it with the right of interlocutory appeal, it casts a design
on the big board, Professor Schwartz said it probably does not
exist in the Supreme Court, but it certainly appears to. The
design is. first, you get rid of the subjective standard of qualified
immunity so you can dispose of it by summary judgment. Then,
you get it ruled upon definitively at the beginning of the case and
you get rid of a lot of cases.
Well, this past term the design worked very nicely. There were
ten immunity appeals of an interlocutory nature. 37 Defendants
succeeded in seven of them, which means that seven cases
33. See, e.g., Lowth v. Town of Cheektowaga, 82 F.3d 563 (2d Cir.

1996) (granting qualified immunity to police for all charges except resisting
arrest); Harlow v. Fitzgerald 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (identifying that qualified
immunity would not be available if an official "knew or reasonably should
have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility
would violate the constitutional rights of the [person], or if he took the action
with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or
other injury ....")(alteration in original) (citation omitted).
34. See. e.g., Rivera v. Senkowski, 62 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 1995) (alleging
retaliation for filing various grievances).
35. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).

36. See, e.g., Blue v. Koren, 72 F.3d 1075 (2d Cir. 1995) (granting

summary judgment for qualified immunity in retaliation claim); Colon v.
Coughlin 58 F.3d 865, 868 (affirming summary judgment on prisoner's
retaliation claim challenging retaliatory imposition of discipline).
37. See, e.g., Jemmott v. Coughlin, 85 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1996); Bove v.
Kennedy, 101 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 1996), Genas v. State of New York Dep't of
Correctional Servs., 75 F.3d 825 (2d Cir. 1996).
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appealed immediately, and were thrown out. This is more than
just a mere delay from the plaintiffs point of view. They lost,
period, at least those seven cases. Earlier today, Professor
Schwartz did talk about this balancing chart. Somebody in the
Supreme Court said, well, we have helped the plaintiffs here by
recognizing retaliation claims, therefore we will help the
defendants by doing qualified immunity, something similar to
what they did a while back with municipalities where they said
that they do not have any qualified immunity, 38 but to make up
for that the court held they cannot be held liable for punitive
damages. 39 And they did that within a couple weeks of each
other, as I recall. I do not know if they have such a balancing
chart and whether that is good or bad, I do not know. It does not
matter, and whether or not there is a balancing chart, these two
issues of qualified immunity and retaliation get to intersect, as
they did in the Second Circuit in Blue v. Koren.4 Let me hold
the Blue case for just a minute. I think I can finish up with that.
I would like to say a little bit more about the retaliation
problems in the Second Circuit. The idea of a retaliation claim
got its start in the First Amendment area, the idea that you speak
out and get knocked down because you spoke. If government can
do that to you, they are indirectly depriving you of your right to
speak. The theory behind this is, if you look at it generally, it
can be applied to any right that a person has. If he can be
penalized in some way for asserting that right, it detracts from
the right. It makes it less meaningful or maybe deprives him
entirely of the right. In analytical terms, you can compare it to an
outright discrimination claim. A typical race discrimination claim
is when you treat someone differently because of their race. 41 It
is really that you treat them differently because of what they are.
A retaliation claim is simply that you treat them differently
38. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 t1980).
39. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
40. 72 F.3d 1075 (2d Cir. 1995).
41. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214. 216, 218 (1944)
(holding that although restrictions curtailing rights of a particular racial group

are subject to "the most rigid scrutiny," it was not beyond the power of
Congress to place restrictions on Japanese citizens for the public safety).
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because of what they did. If what a person does is something they
have a right to do, a federal right to do, or more narrowly a
constitutional right to do. then it should fit into this retaliation
type analysis. It is only gradually that the courts have begun to
recognize this. Without a retaliation claim, many of the
constitutional rights would be, or could be, eroded by
government. So. the retaliation claim has, for a long time,
presented a potent weapon for plaintiffs and a serious caution for
defendants in the civil rights litigation area.
It is only in the last three or four years that we have been
seeing serious recognition of a retaliation claim in the circuit
courts, and now even the Supreme Court is getting into the act.
These claims can be applied to a variety of situations; just this
past year these retaliation claims were recognized in the Second
Circuit: an over-riforous inspection of nursing homes, 42 a
SLAPP suit case, 4 employment discharge, 44 or disciplinary
action against an employee. It does not have to be a discharge.
It can be failure to promote, it can be that someone was sent to
Siberia or something, simply for making a complaint. This is a
whistle-blower-type thing, bringing a lawsuit.
A Seventh Day Adventist said his employer was not making a
reasonable accommodation to his inability to work on Saturday,
and brought a suit and won.4 6 The employer dumped on him in
other ways.
and there was a retaliation claim recognized in that
7
4

context.

An arrest was made of someone for carrying an anti-Clinton
sign at a political demonstration in the City of New York. 4' The
claim was based on retaliation, not on whether there was
probable cause, but whether the only reason that police arrested
him was because of the political message that he had on the sign.
42. See id.
43. See Greenwich Citizens Committee, Inc. v. Counties of Warren and
Washington Industrial Development Agency, 77 F.3d 26 (2d Cir. 1996).
44. See Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318 (2d Cir. 1996).
45. Id.
46. See Genas v. DOCS and Coughlin, 75 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 1995).
47. Id.
48. See Johnson v. Bax, 63 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 1995).
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In another arrest situation, a person claimed that he was arrested
because he objected to the police for the brutal treatment they
were giving to his friend. 49 And they said, "Oh, yeah? You don't
like what we're doing? You're under arrest, too." The issue was

liability for retaliatory arrest. Frequently we get retaliation claims
in a prison situation. A prisoner files a grievance, and then the
administration dumps on him. The prisoner argues: "The reason
you dumped on me is because I objected."

There is a wide variety of possible examples. In general, in
any situation where you have someone who has authority over
someone else, you have the potential for a retaliation claim. Of
course, this is not only employer-employee, but anybody who is
issuing permits, anybody who does inspections, anybody who

does arrests, and so on and so forth. The potential of the use for
this retaliation-type claim is enormous."
Judge Winter went into a good analysis of the problems of
dealing with a retaliation-type claim. One of the significant things
is that he says that these claims are better analyzed under due
process analysis. 52 It has always seemed to me that they come a
little closer to an equal protection-type analysis, but Judge Winter
is speaking as a judge, and this would be the approach that the
Second Circuit would take until the Supreme Court descends into
this maelstrom and gives us further guidance.
49. See Ricketts v. City of Hartford, 74 F.3d 1397 (2d Cir. 1996).
50. See, e.g., Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865 (2d Cir. 1995): Rivera v.
Senkowski, 62 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 1995).
51. See, e.g., Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318 (2d Cir. 1996); Blue v.
Koren, 72 F.3d 1075 (2d Cir. 1995); Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865 (2d Cir.
1995); Rivera v. Senkowski, 62 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 1995): Genas v. DOCS and

Coughlin, 75 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 1995): Greenwich Citizens Committee, Inc. v.
Counties of Warren and Washington Industrial Development Agency, 77 F.3d
26 (2d Cir. 1996); Johnson v. Bax, 63 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 1995); Kaluczky v.
City of White Plains, 57 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 1995): Planned Parenthood of
Dutchess-Ulster v. Steinhaus, 60 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 1996); Ricketts v. City of
Hartford, 74 F.3d 1397 (2d Cir. 1996).
52. Blue v. Koren, 72 F.3d at 1081. Judge Winter explains that retaliation
claim should be analyzed under a due process standard since -the pertinent
conduct of the officials can be scrutinized as a whole. rather than in the
piecemeal, compartmentalized fashion necessary under more specific
constitutional provisions." Id.
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Judge Winter said that "[iln order to state a valid due process
claim for retaliation, a plaintiff must allege that he or she
engaged in conduct that was constitutionally protected." 53 I think
it would be more accurate to say "federally protected," because
we are talking about a claim under Section 1983 and that would
include statutory, as well as constitutional, rights. If the conduct
is protected, there is liability if the retaliation against the
protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the
defendant's actions. That "substantial or motivating factor" is the
language and the idea, incorporated over from the equal
protection-type analysis.
But then, in the last sentence. Judge Winter went further and
analyzed in some detail a qualified immunity summary judgment
motion in a retaliation case. 54 This is where qualified immunity
and retaliation intersect. Retaliation involves why did the
defendant do what he did? It gets into the subjective area. And,
of course, with qualified immunity, the purpose of the Supreme
Court is to get rid of these cases, get the subjective element out
of it. In the retaliation cases, you cannot really get it out.
The response of the circuits had been to impose a heightened
pleading requirement. If we are going to let this case go ahead,
we really have to know the plaintiff has got something. We
cannot just take general allegations. But, the Supreme Court
pretty well signaled that heightened pleading requirements,
particularly against municipalities, are not allowed.5 5 You cannot
raise the initial barrier to get into the lawsuit game.
53. Id. at 1082. "[I]n order to state a valid due process claim for
retaliation, a plaintiff must allege that he or she engaged in conduct that was
constitutionally protected and that retaliation against the protected conduct was
a 'substantial' or 'motivating' factor in the defendant's actions." Id. (quoting
Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287
(1977)).
54. Blue, 72 F.3d at 1082. Judge Winter explains that the plaintiff did not
provide "legally sufficient evidence of retaliatory motive to survive a motion of
summary judgment based on the defense of qualified immunity." Id.
55. Leatherman v. Tarrant Counties Narcotics Intelligence and

Coordinating Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993). The Supreme Court held that a
federal court may not require "heightened pleadings" in Section 1983 cases
brought against municipalities. Id. at 168. The Court explained that the
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But, what do you do with your qualified immunity claim that
also has this subjective element in it? Ultimately the Supreme
Court is going to have to deal with this, and give everybody
some guidance. But Judge Winter's suggestion is that while you
do not have a heightened pleading standard, you really have a
heightened standard on the summary judgment motion. So when
the defendant moves, he says: "I have qualified immunity" and
"I did not know I was violating constitutional rights." It raises
the question what was in his mind. And Judge Winter says the
plaintiff has the obligation on the summary judgment motion to
come forward and show whatever evidence they have that the
defendant acted with this improper mental state.57 So the court
moved, essentially, the heightened pleading standard into a
heightened suimnary judgment standard. 58 But Judge Winter

points out accurately it really is not a "heightened" standard at
all, because Rule 5659 requires that a plaintiff come forward with
the evidence that is available to the plaintiff to establish an
essential element of the case.6

"heightened pleading standard" conflicts with the requirements of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure which call for "'a short plain statement of the
claim.'" Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
56. Blue, 72 F.3d at 1083-84. Judge Winter states that "[we agree that the
plaintiffs must offer specific evidence of improper motivation, but confess
considerable doubt as to whether the 'heightened' standard is really heightened
or is simply an application of the rule that conclusory assertions are insufficient
to defeat a motion for summary judgment." Id.
57. Id. at 1084. Judge winter explains that:
[Ulpon a motion for summary judgment asserting a qualified
immunity defense in an action in which an official's conduct is
objectively reasonable but an unconstitutional subjective intent is
alleged, the plaintiff must proffer particularized evidence of direct
or circumstantial facts ... supporting the claim of an improper
motive in order to avoid summary judgment.
Id.
58. Id.
59. Fm. R. Civ. P. 56.
60. Blue, 72 F.3d at 1083. The court explains that it is "doubtful" that the

heightened standard "imposes a burden greater than is already required under
FED. R. Civ. P. 56." Id.
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Two final points. One, I do not see that much significance in
the Supreme Court case that says you can make two motions;
that 12(b)(6) 62 motion for qualified immunity never should have
been made in the first place. Qualified immunity is an affirmative
defense and until it is put in the case by the answer it just does
not belong there. I do not know why the Supreme Court ever
granted certiorari in the case.
The other thing, in the cases that the Second Circuit decided
during the last year, there are four novel rulings that relate to
Section 1983.63 One technically is not a Section 1983 case, but
64
they held that the provision of the New York Corrections Law
that requires suits against correction officers to be brought in the
State Court of Claims is not a procedural but a substantive
requirement and you cannot bring a pendent claim in federal
court against a corrections officer. 65 Essentially, this provision
creates an immunity in federal court from suits against
corrections officers under state law. 66 It does not bar a Section
1983 claim from the Federal Court.
The second novel ruling is that there is no Section 1983 claim
for a Miranda6 7 violation.
The opinion says this is not
constitutional and that "the remedy for a Miranda violation is
exclusion from evidence." 69 That is rather bizarre to me in light
of statements in the Supreme Court that we should not apply the
exclusionary rule to Miranda violations because there was a

61. Leatherman v. Tarrant Counties
Coordinating Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
62. FFD. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

Narcotics

Intelligence

and

63. See, e.g., Baker v. Coughlin, 77 F.3d 12 (2d Cir. 1996); Neighbor v,
Covert, 689 F.3d 1508 (2d Cir. 1995); Gant v. Wallingford, 69 F.3d 669 (2d
Cir. 1995).

64. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 24 (McKinney 1987).
65. See Baker v. Coughlin III, 77 F.3d 12 (2d Cir. 1996).
66. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 24 (McKinney 1987).
67. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
68. See Neighbor v. Covert, 68 F.3d 1508 (2d Cir. 1995).

69. Id. at 1510. The court states that "the remedy for a Miranda violation
is the exclusion from evidence of any ensuing self-incriminating statements."
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Section 1983 remedy for a person who is deprived of that right.
But this is the law for the time being in the Second Circuit.
Another novel ruling, it seems to me, is that Section 1983
claim does apply in a case brought by black parents for emotional
distress suffered when their child was demoted from the first
grade to kindergarten. Why parents suffered a constitutional
injury because of something that happened to their child, I am not
sure. But the implications for recovery by third parties under
Section 1983 are rather intriguing.
Probably the most highly visible case that the Court dealt with
was the assisted suicide case, where the Second Circuit held not
that there was a constitutional right to die, which the Ninth
Circuit had held, but that the New York statute that bars assisted
suicide violates equal protection. 71 Of course, that now goes to
the Supreme Court. 712While the case got a lot of publicity in the
Court of Appeals, it does not make that much difference, because
the Supreme Court has decided to review both cases.
That is all I have to say about the Second Circuit in this past
year. Thank you very much.
Hon. Leon D. Lazer:

That fantastic statistic of Second Circuit success in the Supreme
Court reminds me of the statistics we used to maintain when I
was in the Appellate Division as to how we were doing vis-a-vis
the other departments. Over a number of years, we found that the
rate of reverse or modification of Appellate Division rulings,
orders, judgments, whatever, ran at about 30 to 35 percent, it
may be of some interest to you, and of course we were always
interested in the Second Department as to how it was doing in
relation to the others, and we were doing pretty well. One of the
other departments was not, and was a consistent loser. But that
has changed with the appointment of a number of very effective
judges in that department. But at 35 percent we did somewhat
70. See Gant v. Wallingford, 69 F.3d 1508 (2d Cir. 1995).
71. See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996).
72. Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 36 (1996).
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better than the Second Circuit, at least since you have departed,
Judge. At this point we are going to take a ten-minute break. We
have, following the break, I think two of the most interesting
presentations we are going to have today, the First Amendment
and the criminal law holdings, so let us please hold it to ten
minutes. (Recess taken).
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